CLAGETT v. COMMONWEALTH
252 Va. 79, 472 S.E.2d 263 (1996)
Supreme Court of Virginia by unknown
Capital Defense Journal
Volume 9 | Issue 1 Article 16
Fall 9-1-1996
CLAGETT v. COMMONWEALTH 252 Va. 79,
472 S.E.2d 263 (1996) Supreme Court of Virginia
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Fourteenth Amendment Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections
Commons
This Casenote, Va. Supreme Ct. is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
CLAGETT v. COMMONWEALTH 252 Va. 79, 472 S.E.2d 263 (1996) Supreme Court of Virginia, 9 Cap. DEF J. 48 (1996).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol9/iss1/16
Page 48 - Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1
CLAGETT v. COMMONWEALTH
252 Va. 79, 472 S.E.2d 263 (1996)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On June 30, 1994, Richard T. Reed arrived at the Witchduck Inn, a
tavern and restaurant in Virginia Beach. Upon entering the back door of
the Inn, Reed discovered the bodies of Inn owner Lam Van Son, Inn
employees Wendell Parish and Karen Sue Rounds, and Inn patron
Abdelaziz Gren. Each victim had been shot once in the head. The Inn's
cash register was open and empty. Based upon information supplied by
Denise Holsinger, Michael David Clagett's girlfriend, Clagett was
identified as a suspect in the killings. He was arrested on July 1, 1994 on
a public intoxication charge. Once in custody, Clagett was served with
arrest warrants for the murders. Clagett confessed to the killings, admit-
ting that he and Holsinger had intended to "rob" the inn and that
Holsinger had taken approximately $400 from the cash register. 1
On October 3,1994, two indictments were returned against Clagett.
In the first indictment, Clagett was charged with four separate counts of
capital murder during the commission of a robbery, 2 and various related
non-capital offenses. In the second indictment, Clagett was charged with
one count of multiple homicide capital murder.3 The second indictment
predicated the charge of multiple homicide murder on the killing of all
four victims as part of the same act or transaction.4
Clagett was convicted on all charges, and at the conclusion of the
penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict of five death sentences, based
upon a finding of both "vileness" and "future dangerousness." Thus,
Clagett received five death sentences for four homicides. Clagett ap-
pealed his death sentences, challenging the Commonwealth's failure to
disclose certain statements, the refusal of the trial court to strike certain
jurors for cause, and the fact that five death sentences were imposed for
four homicides.5
HOLDING
Apart from the conviction and sentence for multiple homicide
capital murder, the Supreme Court of Virginia found no error in the
rulings of the trial court. The court held that the trial court's refusal to
strike jurors for cause was not an abuse of discretion and that the trial
court properly denied Clagett's request for disclosure of the notes of a
police officer and a statement made by a potential witness. Because the
I Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 84,472 S.E.2d 263,266
(1996).
2 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(4).
3 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(7).
4 Clagett, 252 Va. at 83, 472 S.E.2d at 265.
5 Id. at 88-90, 95-96, 472 S.E.2d at 268-269, 272-273.
6 The court rejected all of defendant's assignments of error. Some
of the rulings provide little if any guidance because they apply broad,
settled principles of law to facts that are specific to the case being
reviewed. Issues that will not be addressed in this summary include: (1)
admission of videotape and photographs; (2) trial court's refusal to grant
a mistrial after court sustained one of defendant's objections to domestic
abuse testimony; (3) suppression of post-arrest statements; (4) denial of
defendant's proposed question for the jury panel designed to assure the
removal of those jurors who would automatically impose the death
penalty; (5) admissibility of prior criminal acts; (6) the state's failure to
court held that the conviction for multiple homicide capital murder was
derivative of the convictions for capital murders during the commission
of a robbery, it vacated the sentence and conviction formultiple homicide
murder and affirmed the remainder of the judgment of the trial court
including each of the four convictions for capital murder during the
commission of a robbery and the corresponding death sentences. 6
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
1. A Note on Default
Because Clagett did not address in his brief the issues raised in five
assignments of error, the court found that he waived them on direct
appeal by failure to include them in his brief 7 The holding is yet another
reminder that in order to preserve the issues, it is imperative that defense
counsel object at trial, assign errors, and brief the assignments. Although
it is often impossible to brief every assignment of error within the 50 page
limit imposed by the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, defense
counsel may move for permission to exceed the 50 page limit.
8
Introducing a new twist on default, the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that assignment of error 14 relating to the cross-examination of a
witness was defaulted because although counsel properly objected to the
error at trial, counsel advanced a different argument on appeal than he
advanced to the trial judge in support of his objection. 9 To support this
argument, the court cited Rule 5:25, which provides that "error will not
be sustained to any ruling of the trial court or the commission before
which the case was initially tried unless the objection was stated with
reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause
shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice." The text of
Rule 5:25 does not require that every conceivable argument supporting
an objectionbe advanced to the trialjudge.10 At aminimum, the practical
message is that defense counsel must take whatever time is required, no
matter how it may slow the trial, to raise all grounds for an objection,
including the renewal of objections later in the trial and the offering of
additional arguments.
Some issues not discussed by the Supreme Court of Virginia or
treated in a cursory fashion by the court were nonetheless well-preserved
by counsel. They included (1) the denial of defendant's request for bill
disclose firearms expert's report prior to trial; (7) prosecution's recall of
a witness to correct her testimony; (8) corroboration of defendant's
confession; (9) sufficiency of the evidence; (10) jury instruction on
flight; and (11) jury instruction on circumstantial evidence.
7 Clagett, 252 Va. at 84-85,472 S.E.2d at 266 (citing Rule 5:27).
8 Rule 5:26(a) provides, in relevant part: "Except by permission
of ajustice of this Court, neither the opening brief of appellant, nor the
brief of appellee, nor a brief of amicus curiae shall exceed 50 typed or 36
printed pages .... Page limits under this Rule do not include appendices."
(emphasis added) Denial of permission should itself be assigned as error
on federal due process grounds.
9 Clagett, 252 Va. at 85, 472 S.E.2d at 266.
10 For further discussion of the implications of this new interpre-
tation, see case summary of Goins v. Commonwealth, Capital Defense
Journal, this issue.
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of particulars; (2) denial of defendant's request for assistance of an expert
medical witness to examine his former spouse in order to refute her
claims of domestic violence; (3) denial of defendant's request for
additional peremptory challenges; (4) the admissibility of an interview
of defendant with a local reporter, and (5) the constitutionality of
Virginia's death penalty statutes.11
Furthermore, defense counsel preserved an importantclaim relative
to communication of accurate parole information to the jury. During its
sentencing phase deliberations, the jury submitted a two-part question to
the trial court asking it to define a life sentence with respect to the effect
of parole and asking whether mandatory sentences were served concur-
rently or consecutively. The trial court responded that the jury should
"impose such punishment" it felt the evidence warranted and "not to
concern [itself] with what might happen afterwards." 12
On appeal, Clagett argued that based on Simmons v. South Caro-
lina,13 the jurors should have been instructed that the mandatory sen-
tences had to run consecutively. The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld
the trial court's response to the jury's inquiry, stating that Simmons was
inapplicable to Clagett because he was not parole ineligible. 14 However,
the United States Supreme Court has not decided whether the reasoning
of Simmons also applies to life sentenced prisoners who, like Clagett,
would technically be eligible for parole many years later. Thus, the fact
that defense counsel in Clagett preserved the Simmons issue is very
important. Simmons rests on the proposition that a defendant has a due
process right to rebut the state's case for death. In the future, parole
evidence may be found to be permissible also as evidence in mitiga-
tion.
15
11. Testimony of Potential Sentencing Phase Witness During
Guilt Phase
During the guilt phase, the Commonwealth called Wendy Singer as
a witness. Clagett objected to her testimony and moved for a mistrial on
the ground that Singer had been identified as a potential witness only
shortly before trial and that the Commonwealth had indicated that she
would be called only during the penalty phase. The Supreme Court of
Virginia held that there was no prejudice to Clagett, stating, "Even
accepting Clagett's assertions as true, he was nonetheless informed that
Singer was a potential witness prior to trial." 16
The court's conclusion that there was no prejudice to Clagett was an
overstatement, as the relevant issues during the guilt phase are not the
same as those relevant during the sentencing phase. For example, a
reasonable attorney would be on notice to meet evidence supporting the
Commonwealth's burden of proving "vileness" or "future dangerous-
ness." There would be no reason to investigate or prepare to meet
testimony from Singer in support of Clagett's guilt of capital murder.
11 Clagett, 252 Va. at 85-86, 472 S.E.2d at 266-67.
12 Id. at 94, 472 S.E.2d at 272.
13 114 S. Ct.2187 (1994) (holding that where future dangerousness
is at issue and state law prohibits parole if defendant sentenced to life in
prison, due process requires that jury be informed--either by instruction
or by argument of counsel-that the only alternative to a death sentence
is a sentence of life without parole).
14 Because Clagett's offense occurred prior to Virginia's abolition
of parole on January 1, 1995, Clagett would technically have been
eligible for future parole consideration under former Va. Code Ann.
53.1-151 if sentenced to life in prison.
15 For discussion of the rationale of Simmons, see case summary of
O'Dell v. Netherland, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
16 Clagett, 252 Va. at 87,472 S.E.2d at 267.
mH. Failure of Commonwealth to Disclose Statements
During his trial, Clagett requested an opportunity to examine the
notes of a police officer and the statement made by a potential witness.
Both of Clagett's requests were denied. In neither instance did the court
review the material, nor did Clagett's counsel request an in camera
review of such notes and statements. Because the notes and the statement
were not made part of the record, the Supreme Court of Virginia was
limited in its review of the rulings made by the trial court to the
representations made by the Commonwealth.
At a suppression hearing, the arresting officer was permitted,
without objection, to refresh her memory by examining an investigation
memorandum prepared following the arrest. During cross-examination,
defense counsel determined that the officer prepared this memorandum
using handwritten notes taken at the time of Clagett's arrest. Clagett
requested that these notes be produced for his examination, and the
officer retrieved them at the request of the court. The Commonwealth
represented to the trial court that no statements made by Clagett or other
potentially exculpatory evidence were contained within the notes, and
the trial court denied Clagett's request to review the notes based upon on
the Commonwealth's representation.
17
According to the law of evidence in Virginia, a defendant in
Clagett's situation has a right to examine the material used by the witness
to refresh her memory. 18 Thus, Clagett had a right to view the investiga-
tion memorandum. Although there is no rule of evidence that would
directly permit a defendant in Clagett's position to view the notes used
to prepare the memorandum, it is arguable that a defendant has a right to
examine the notes based on his Sixth Amendment right to confront and
effectively cross-examine awitness, quiteapartfrom theCommonwealth's
obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence.
Clagett also sought disclosure of statements made by his girlfriend,
Holsinger. The Commonwealth represented that her statements were
wholly inculpatory and did not offer any exculpatory benefit to Clagett.
On that basis, the trial court again denied Clagett's request to review
these statements. Holsinger did not testify at Clagett's trial. 19
Even assuming that this claim involved only the duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence, there is a danger inherent in allowing the Com-
monwealth to decide what is or is not exculpatory. The scope of what is
"exculpatory" is very extensive.20 Furthermore, the right to view
exculpatory material is not limited to the statements of those witnesses
who testify at trial. Thus, at the very least, if defense counsel is not
permitted to see what the witness uses to refresh her recollection or to
view witness statements represented to be wholly inculpatory, defense
counsel should make such statements part of the record by: (1) referring
to the applicable Virginia law, the Sixth Amendment right to effectively
cross-examine, and the right to have exculpatory evidence, 21 and (2)
17 Id. at 88,472 S.E.2d at 268-69.
18 Friend, The Law Of Evidence In Virginia § 3-7 (a) (1996).
19 Clagett, 252 Va. at 89, 472 S.E.2d at 269.
20 See Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995). In Kyles, the Court
held to be exculpatory: (1) evidence casting doubt on certainty and
reliability of eyewitness testimony, (2) prior statements of state's key
witness, and (3) evidence showing that state's investigation was less than
thorough. See also case summary of Gray v. Netherland, Capital
Defense Journal, this issue.
21 Kyles v. Whitely, note 19, supra; Brady v.Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
87 (1963) (holding that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or punishment").
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requesting an in camera review and moving that the documents be
preserved for further appellate review. If necessary, and in an appropriate
case, effort should be made to have the Commonwealth attorney testify
concerning her understanding of the law regarding her obligation to
disclose exculpatory material.
22
IV. Voir Dire Issues
During voir dire, Clagett sought to ask the members of the venire if
they would automatically impose the death penalty even if they accepted
Clagett's theory of the case. The trial court ruled, and the Supreme Court
of Virginia upheld, that this was not the proper inquiry. Instead, the trial
court permitted the members of the venire to be asked the narrowest form
of question addressed in Morgan v. Illinois:23 whether they would
automatically impose the death penalty "no matter what the facts
were."24 Although the refusal to ask the question in the words sought by
Clagett may not have been error, it did reveal the trial court's cramped
view of what disqualifies potential capital jurors. That being so, it is
important for defense counsel to know how to preserve the record if the
court is going to permit what defense counsel considers unlawfully pro-
death jurors to sit.25
First, defense counsel should request that the juror be removed for
cause. Denial calls for objection on federal grounds and request for
additional peremptory strikes. If the trial court refuses to accord the
defendant an additional peremptory challenge, it should then be made
clear on the record that the defense would have used the additional
peremptory challenge to strike the juror. If the arguably "pro-death"juror
is then chosen to sit on the jury that ultimately sentences the defendant
to death, objection must again be made at the time the jury is empaneled.
This process will preserve the issue on federal grounds under Ross v.
Oklahoma26 for appellate review. Further, under Virginia law entitling
the defendant to a pool of twenty qualified veniremen, if the appellate
court finds that the trial court erred in refusing to remove the killer juror
for cause, note that even the prosecution's use of a peremptory challenge
to remove the killer juror will not cure the error or remove the prejudice
to the defendant.27
22 Kyles is particularly helpful when dealing with trial judges on this
issue.
23 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
24 Id. at 723.
25 In Clagett, defense counsel objected to two veniremen as being
unlawfully pro-death jurors: Holmes and Gunby. During voir dire,
Holmes stated that it was "silly" of Clagett to confess "at the early stages
of the charges." Holmes later stated that he did not know Clagett's state
of mind at the time of his confession and twice stated that he could base
his verdict solely on the evidence presented at trial. Holmes was selected
as a member of the jury. Clagett, 252 Va. at 89-90, 472 S.E.2d at 269.
Responding to a lengthy question posed by Clagett containing
hypothetical facts similar to the case, Gunby stated that he would impose
the death penalty without considering a sentence of life imprisonment.
When questioned further by the Commonwealth, Gunby stated that he
had misunderstood the question and that he could consider imposition of
life imprisonment. The defense used one of its peremptory strikes to
remove Gunby from the panel. Clagett, 252 Va. at 90,472 S.E.2d at 269.
26 487 U.S. 81 (1988). In Ross, the defendant was charged with
capital murder. After the trial court denied defendant's motion to remove
for cause prospective juror Huling, who had declared that he would vote
to impose the death penalty automatically if the jury found defendant
guilty, the defense exercised one of its peremptory challenges. The jury
However, assuming defense counsel still has a peremptory chal-
lenge left to challenge an arguably pro-death juror, the better tactical
decision will often be to remove the killer juror. Obtaining the best
possible jury even at the expense of preserving an appellate issue is
usually the best cause of action. In an effort to preserve under Ross even
after the strike, however, counsel could: (1) move to strike the juror for
cause; (2) object to the denial of the challenge for cause on federal
grounds; (3) request additional peremptory challenges on due process
grounds; (4) strike the killer juror; and (5) if other jurors are also arguably
pro-death, indicate that such jurors would have been struck had addi-
tional peremptory challenges been granted.
V. Double Jeopardy in Sentencing
In vacating the conviction and death sentence formultiplehomicide
capital murder in Clagett, the Supreme Court of Virginia compared the
circumstances of Clagett with its holding in Buchanan v. Common-
wealth,28 stating
Although Buchanan dealt with greater and lesser degrees of
homicide, we believe that the same rationale should apply to
cases where the convictions are for crimes of equal magnitude.
In this case, each of the convictions for capital murder during
the commission of a robbery should stand on its own. The
conviction for multiple homicide capital murder, although of
equal magnitude, is derivative of the other four.
29
Although the Commonwealth may advance multiple theories for
the commission of a crime, and under Blockburger v. United States,
30
cumulative punishment is allowed if the statute for each offense requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not, the court's holding
in Clagett may nonetheless be useful to defense counsel in Virginia.
Based on Clagett, counsel can move to strike the Commonwealth's
evidence on "derivative" conclusions at the close of the Commonwealth's
case. If successful, it may at least combat the cumulative effect of the
evidence on the jury, particularly at sentencing.
Summary and analysis by:
Lisa M. Jenio
found defendant guilty and sentenced him to death. The defendant
appealed his conviction, arguing that the failure to remove Huling for
cause violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to an impartial
jury. The Court held that although the trial court erred in failing to remove
Huling for cause under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), and
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), such failure did not abridge his
right to a fair trial, since Huling did not sit on the jury. The Court stated,
"Had Huling sat on the jury that ultimately sentenced petitioner to death,
and had petitioner properly preserved his right to challenge the trial
court's failure to remove Huling for cause, the sentence would have to be
overturned." Ross, 487 U.S. at 85.
27 See DeHart v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 139,449 S.E.2d 59
(1994)(holding that where trial court erred in failing to strike a juror for
cause, the prosecution's use of peremptory challenge to strike the juror
did not remove any prejudice to defendant or cure any error in the trial
court's refusal to strike the juror for cause.)
28 238 Va. 389,384 S.E.2d 757 (1989). In Buchanan, the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that an "excess conviction must be set aside and
therelated sentence vacated."Id. at415, 384S.E.2d at 772 (citing Morris
v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 206, 209, 321 S.E.2d 633,634-35 (1984)).
29 Clagett, 252 Va. at 95-96, 472 S.E.2d at 273.
30 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
